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Abstract
The paper presents a unified framework where claim and cost sharing
problems are jointly analyzed. Both problems have the following com-
mon characteristic: given a proposal the agents valuate the suitability of
the proposal in two ways, checking how much they loss and how much
they gain. Taking this into account, we construct the vector of awards
and losses for any proposal and we use different egalitarian criteria to
select among these vectors. We use the Lorenz, the Least Square and
the lexicographic criteria and we analyze the solutions arising from the
application of these criteria in the sets of vectors of awards-losses. In
particular, we characterize the members of two families of solutions: the
family of Weighted Least Square Solutions and the family of Imputation
Selector Weighted Least Square Solutions. The second family includes
between its members well-known solutions as Constrained Equal Awards
and Constrained Equal Losses solutions.
1 Introduction
A claim problem consists of a set of claimants who must divide between them-
selves an infinitely divisible good, the endowment, that is not enough to satisfy
their claims entirely. The question of how to divide the endowment fairly be-
tween the claimants has been widely analyzed and many rules have been defined
and characterized to provide axiomatic support. Following this approach, fair-
ness is identified with a list of axioms and any solution satisfying the list of
axioms is considered as a potential solution to the problem. These rules and
their characterizations play a central role in the literature of fair allocation.
A similar approach has been used in a different problem that shares an
almost identical mathematical formulation with claim problems. For example,
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in a cost sharing problem where agents are ordered according to their needs for
a public project, if the need of the last agent (the one with the greatest need)
is met then all agents with lesser needs are also satisfied. A solution to any of
these problems consists of dividing the cost of a common project between the
agents involved in it. Again, an important aspect of the problem is to define
rules that provide fair division of the total cost between the agents.
The existence of many different rules claiming to be valid for providing fair
allocation indicates how difficult is to define fairness. On page 3 of his book
“Equity in Theory and Practice” [19] Young says the following:
These sharing rules, which in some cases are elaborately defined,
express a notion of equity in the division of jointly produced goods.
By equitable I do not necessarily mean ethical or moral, but that
which a given society considers to be appropriate to the need, status
and contributions of its various members.
Under the same ideal of equity or fairness different societies could give rise to
different sharing rules for the same sharing problems.
When considering the fairness of an allocation, in both types of problem,
agents realize that any allocation can be analyzed in two ways: assuming that
we are dealing with a claim problem, given a distribution of the endowment
agents perceive that they gain something (the amount they receive) but they
also lose something (the amount they do not receive: the difference between
their claim and the amount received). The terms gain and loss are reversed if
we consider cost sharing problems.
This paper also deals with this approach -albeit indirectly- but the initial
viewpoint is slightly different. Instead of dealing directly with axioms, in our
approach the fairness of a proposal is associated with the selection of egalitar-
ian proposals that take into account both aspects of any distribution of the
endowment: awards and losses.
Our paper seeks to give a more unified view of some normative solutions. We
consider that the idea of fairness should be explicited by answering the following
two questions:
1. What egalitarian criterion is used to make egalitarian comparisons be-
tween elements?
2. From what set are those elements taken?
The answers may help us to understand the similarities and differences be-
tween solutions and this is the first major contribution of this paper.
The first question asks what tool is used to make comparisons (of fairness)
between different elements (vectors). Using arguments of fairness when selecting
a specific element implicitly imposes the idea of comparison between different
elements. This is needed to argue that the elements chosen are better than the
elements not chosen. In other words, the selected vector dominates1 the vectors
that are not selected.
1The terms better and dominates require precise definitions.
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Probably the most relevant criteria in literature are the Lorenz criterion, the
Least Square criterion and the Lexicographic criterion.
In most of the literature on egalitarianism it is agreed that an allocation
should be maximal according to the Lorenz criterion as a least requirement for
calling it egalitarian. The Lorenz order is not a complete order and therefore, in
general, does not select a unique element. The criterion selects a set of Lorenz
maximal elements that are not comparable one with another (from the point of
view of the Lorenz criterion). The other two criteria are complete and select
Lorenz maximal elements.
The second question is about the set from which these maximal egalitarian
allocations must be selected. In our work we consider sets of weighted vectors
of awards and losses. The weights seek to reflect the importance of these two
aspects of the allocations. If only awards matter the vector of losses is irrelevant
and therefore weighted with parameter 0. In the symmetric case awards and
losses are treated equally.
The most relevant, most widely, analyzed solutions for claim problems are
Constrained Equal Awards (CEA), Constrained Equal Losses (CEL), the Tal-
mud Rule and the Proportional Rule. In this study we examine what answers
are given by these solutions to these two questions. They are all solutions that
select maximal egalitarian vectors in a given set. They can be seen as selectors
of lexicographical maximal elements in a determined set. We also provide an
alternative definition of the CEA, CEL and Proportional Rule as selectors of
Least Square maximal elements in a determined set. Clearly, they are Lorenz
maximal element selectors.
A second major contribution of the paper is the axiomatic analysis provided
for the solutions arising from the application of the Lorenz and Least Square
criteria. This aspect can be seen as the answer to a third question that is also
central in the literature of fair allocation.
3. What set of axioms supports each solution?
With the Lorenz criterion we show that any Lorenz maximal allocation
should be order preserving for gains and losses (the agent with a lower de-
mand gains and loses no more than the agent with a higher demand) and any
allocation that is order preserving (in gains and losses) is a Lorenz maximal
allocation.
With the Least Square criterion we identify the family of solutions that
satisfy additivity, order preservation and anonymity. These solutions are new
in the literature and each of them is characterized by adding an axiom to the
previous three axioms. If we require the solution to select imputations (asking
for a property that we call the Imputation Selector Property) we are dealing with
another family of solutions that are characterized using, among other axioms,
a weaker version of the classical axiom of additivity. This family includes the
CEA, CEL and the Reverse Talmud Rule. We also provide a characterization
for each member of the family.
The two families arise because additivity and the Imputation Selector Prop-
erty are incompatible. It is because, in general, only solutions that select impu-
3
tations have been considered2 that the existence of Least Square Solutions has
remained hidden. The requirement of Imputation Selection implies that other
axioms (in particular additivity) cannot be satisfied.
The Lexicographic criterion defines a family of solutions that includes the
well-known Talmud Rule, characterized by Aumann and Maschler [2]. We also
analyze Weighted Talmud Rules by weighting awards and losses differently (the
Talmud Rule weights awards and losses equally). These solutions have been
studied by Moreno-Ternero and Villar [12].
In our paper, many relevant solutions in the literature of claim problems
are presented as optimal elements in a given set. A similar analysis has been
performed in the context of TU games where the most relevant single-valued so-
lution concepts (the Shapley value and the nucleolus among them) are identified
with an egalitarian criterion applied in a given set.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model,
the egalitarian criteria and the set of vectors of awards and losses. Section 3
studies the Lorenz criterion. Section 4 and 5 deal with the Least Square criterion
in two different sets. Section 6 is for the lexicographical criterion and Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Claim problems
The tuple (N, d,E) is a claim problem if:
a) N is a finite nonempty set.
b)
∑
i∈N
di > E.
N represents the set of agents or claimants. Then i  j means that we
assume di ≤ dj and d1 ≥ 0. We denote by Γ the class of claim problems.
An allocation to the claimants is represented by a real valued vector x ∈ RN .
The i-th coordinate of the vector x denotes the allocation given to claimant i.
The vector x is called efficient if x(N) =
∑
i∈N xi = E and the set of all efficient
vectors is called the preimputation set and is denoted by PI (N, d,E).
A subset of the preimputation set is the imputation set denoted by I(N, d,E).
An imputation is an efficient vector where di ≥ xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
Solutions and Properties
A solution φ on a set of problems Γ is a mapping that associates a vector
φ (N, d,E) ∈ PI (N, d,E) with every problem (N, d,E) in Γ. Unlike many other
authors we do not require a solution concept to select only imputations. This is
2Note that in TU games this requirement implies that the Shapley value and the prenu-
cleolus are not solutions (at least in the class of all TU games).
4
also why we prefer the term solution to the term rule which is used assuming
that a rule selects imputations.
Some well-known solutions are3:
Constrained equal awards (CEA). This solution divides the endowment
equally among the agents under the constraint that no claimant receives more
than his claim.
Constrained equal losses (CEL). This solution divides the total loss
(
∑
i∈N
di − E) equally among the agents under the constraint that no claimant
receives a negative amount.
The Proportional Solution (PS). This solution divides the endowment
among the claimants proportionally to their claims.
These three solutions always select imputations. The no constrained versions
of the first two solutions (EA and EL) do not necessarily select imputations.
Some convenient, well-known properties of a solution φ in Γ are the following.
P1) φ satisfies scale invariance (SCIN) if for each (N, d,E) in Γ and λ > 0
we have that φ(N,λd, λE) = λφ(N, d,E).
P2) φ satisfies anonymity (AN) if for each (N, d,E) in Γ and each bijective
mapping τ : N −→ N ′ such that (N ′, τd, E) ∈ Γ we have that φ(N ′, τd, E) =
τ(φ(N, d,E)). In this case (N, d,E) and (N ′, τd, E) are equivalent claim prob-
lems.
P3) φ satisfies the equal treatment property (ETP) if for each (N, d,E)
in Γ equal claimants i, j are treated equally, i.e., φi(N, d,E) = φj(N, d,E). Here,
i and j are equal if di = dj .
P4) φ satisfies order preservation for awards and losses (ORDPRE) if
for each (N, d,E) in Γ we have that φ(N, d,E) is order preserving for awards
and losses. An allocation x is order preserving for awards and losses if di ≤ dj
implies that xi ≤ xj and di − xi ≤ dj − xj .
P5) φ satisfies resource monotonicity (MON) if given (N, d,E), (N, d,E∗) ∈
Γ with E∗ > E then φi(N, d,E) ≤ φi(N, d,E
∗) for all i ∈ N .
P6) φ satisfies additivity (ADD) if (N, d,E), (N, d′, E′) ∈ Γ with (N, d +
d′, E + E′) ∈ Γ then φ(N, d + d′, E + E′) = φ(N, d,E) + φ(N, d′, E′).
The first five properties are satisfied for the most important solutions. Prop-
erty 4 implies property 3. Auman and Maschler [2] introduced order preserva-
tion. In the survey by Thomson [16] Scale Invariance is called Homogeneity.
2.2 Egalitarian Criteria
For any vector z ∈ Rd we denote by θ(z) the vector that results from z by
permuting the coordinates in such a way that θ1(z) ≤ θ2(z) ≤ ... ≤ θd(z). Let
x, y ∈ Rd.
We say that the vector x Lorenz dominates the vector y (denoted by x ≻L y)
if
k∑
i=1
θi(x) ≥
k∑
i=1
θi(y) for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d} and if at least one of these inequal-
3A long list of solutions can be found in a survey by Thomson [16].
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ities is strict. The vector x weakly Lorenz dominates the vector y (denoted by
x L y) if
k∑
i=1
θi(x) ≥
k∑
i=1
θi(y) for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}.
The vector x lexicographically dominates the vector y (denoted by x ≻lex
y) if there exists k such that θi(x) = θi(y) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1} and
θk(x) > θk(y). The vector x weakly lexicographically dominates the vector y
(denoted by x lex y) if either there exists k such that θi(x) = θi(y) for all
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1} and θk(x) > θk(y) or θi(x) = θi(y) for all i.
The vector x least square dominates the vector y (denoted by x ≻LS y) if
d∑
i=1
x2i <
d∑
i=1
y2i . The vector x weakly least square dominates the vector y (denoted
by x LS y) if
d∑
i=1
x2i ≤
d∑
i=1
y2i .
The vector x lexicographically dominates the vector y (denoted by x ≻lex
y) if there exists k such that θi(x) = θi(y) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1} and
θk(x) > θk(y). The vector x weakly lexicographically dominates the vector y
(denoted by x lex y) if either there exists k such that θi(x) = θi(y) for all
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1} and θk(x) > θk(y) or θi(x) = θi(y) for all i.
These last two criteria provide maximal Lorenz allocations.
2.3 The set of awards-losses vectors
Let (N, d,E) be a problem and let x be an efficient allocation. Each agent
measures xi in two ways. In one sense xi measures how much he\she receives.
In the other sense, di − xi measures how much he\she does not receive. We
consider a unified framework where different models can be jointly analyzed. For
cost problems the vector x measures the cost that each agent is going to receive
and can be seen as a loss while the vector d− x measures the gain that he\she
obtains from x. If we think in terms of bankruptcy problems the arguments
are reversed4. Given the allocation x we define its associated ordered5 vector of
awards-losses as follows:
xAL = (x1, ..., xn, x1 − d1, ..., xn − dn).
We also use the following notation;
xA = (x1, ..., xn) and
xL = (x1 − d1, ..., xn − dn).
4In fact, it is only in Section 3 that this consideration matters. Given that we use the
Least Square criterion or the set of vectors in absolute terms, the issue of which elements of
the vector are losses and which are awards plays no role in the rest of the sections.
5Fixing the order of coalitions is a technical trick to obtain a homeomorphism between the
two topological vector spaces: the space of preimputations and the space of ordered vectors
of awards-losses.
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In this vector, awards and losses are equally weighted and equally treated.
We also consider vectors where awards and losses are not equally treated. Given
the allocation x we define its associated weighted vector of awards-losses as
follows:
λ-xAL = ((1− λ)x1, ..., (1− λ)xn, λ(x1 − d1), ..., λ(xn − dn))
where λ ∈ [0, 1] . Note that λ-xAL with λ = 12 is the vector of equal weights,
which in our study is equivalent to considering xAL or λ-xAL with λ = 12 .
We also use the following notation:
ALλ(PI (N, d,E)) =
{
λ-xAL; x ∈ PI (N, d,E)
}
and ALλ(I (N, d,E)) ={
λ-xAL; x ∈ I (N, d,E)
}
.
The following notation
∣∣ALλ(PI (N, d,E))∣∣ = {∣∣λ-xAL∣∣ ; x ∈ PI (N, d,E)}
and
∣∣ALλ(I (N, d,E))∣∣ = {∣∣λ-xAL∣∣ ; x ∈ I (N, d,E)} is used to denote the set
of vectors of awards-losses taken in absolute terms.
Note that we use the notation λ-xAL instead of λ-xAL(N, d,E). We consider
there is no confusion, so we prefer the notation λ-xAL for the sake of simplicity.
3 The Lorenz criterion
The first egalitarian criterion we consider is the Lorenz criterion. The Lorenz
order is not complete and therefore by applying this criterion we do not, in
general, obtain uniqueness. In this sense, the set of Lorenz maximal allocations
(the set of Lorenz undominated allocations) can be seen as the maximal set of
fair allocations. A Lorenz dominated allocation is not a candidate for selection
when looking for fair allocations.
We define the Lorenz maximal set as the set of Lorenz undominated
allocations, that is,
L(PI(N, d,E)) =
{
x ∈ PI(N, d,E); there is no y ∈ PI(N, d,E)
such that yAL ≻L x
AL
}
.
The Lorenz maximal set coincides with the set of allocations that satisfy or-
der preservation in both ways, awards and losses. Therefore, order preservation
emerges as a minimal requirement for a fair allocation.
The proof of this result relies on the following fact. For two elements k and
l, a vector x, and a real number α > 0, we say that (k, l, x, α) is an equalizing
bilateral transfer (of size α from k to l with respect to x) if
xk − α ≥ xl + α.
Now, Lemma 2 of Hardy, Littlewood and Polya [6] implies that an allocation
y Lorenz dominates another allocation x only if y can be obtained from x by a
finite sequence of equalizing bilateral transfers.
Theorem 1 The Lorenz maximal set coincides with the set of all allocations
that satisfy order preservation in both ways: awards and losses.
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Proof. Let x ∈ PI(N, d,E) be such that x is not order preserving for
awards. Therefore, there are claimants i, j such that di ≥ dj and xi < xj. Then
it also holds that di − xi > dj − xj . Consider the following allocation z :
zl =


xl + ε if l = i
xl − ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where ε = min(
xj−xi
2 ,
(di−xi)−(dj−xj)
2 ).
It is not difficult to check that z L x since it still holds that zi ≤ zj
and di − zi ≥ dj − zj . The proof is similar in the case where x violates order
preservation for losses.
Let x be an allocation satisfying order preservation for awards and losses.
Then ∑
1≤i≤n
θi(x
AL) = E −
∑
1≤i≤n
di
since the first n elements of the vector θ(xAL) are the ordered losses (xn −
dn, ..., x1 − d1)
6. Note also that
2n∑
i=n+1
θi(x
AL) =
∑
1≤i≤n
xi = E
since the last n elements of the vector θ(xAL) are the ordered awards (x1, ..., xn).
Therefore, if there is an allocation z such that zAL ≻L x
AL should be the case
that zL ≻L x
L and zA L x
A or zL L x
L and zA ≻L x
A. If zA ≻L x
A then zA
can be obtained from xA by a finite sequence of equalizing bilateral transfers.
Now consider a vector yA resulting from xA after a bilateral equalizing
transfer. Let i, j two claimants such that xi < xj
yl =


xl + ε if l = i
xl − ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where 0 < ε ≤
xj−xi
2 .
It is clear that yA ≻L x
A implies that xL ≻L y
L and therefore yAL does not
Lorenz dominate xAL.
A similar consideration follows for the case where we consider Lorenz domi-
nation with respect to the vector xL. That is, if there exists an allocation y such
that yL ≻L x
L then xA ≻L y
A and therefore yAL does not Lorenz dominate
xAL.
The following corollary arises immediately since a convex combination of
order preserving allocations is also order preserving.
6If there is any x1 < (xi − di) we have the following contradiction:
x1 < (xi − di) ≤ (x1 − d1) < x1.
8
Corollary 2 The Lorenz maximal set is convex.
Similar results are obtainable if we restrict the search of allocations to the
set of imputations. In this way, the set
L(I(N, d,E)) =
{
x ∈ I(N, d,E); there is no y ∈ PI(N, d,E)
such that yAL ≻L x
AL
}
coincides with the set of all imputations that satisfy order preservation in both
ways.
However, the theorem is not true if we consider weighted vectors of awards-
losses. For example, it is immediately apparent that if we take λ = 0
L0(PI(N, d,E)) =
{
x ∈ PI(N, d,E); there is no y ∈ PI(N, d,E)
such that yA ≻L x
A
}
coincides with
{
(E
n
, ..., E
n
)
}
and if we take λ = 1 the set
L1(PI(N, d,E)) =
{
x ∈ PI(N, d,E); there is no y ∈ PI(N, d,E)
such that yL ≻L x
L
}
coincides with
{(
di −
P
i∈N
di−E
n
)
i∈N
}
.
These results were noted by Bosmans et al. [4] when studying Lorenz com-
parisons between vectors of n elements (being n the number of claimants). Many
other authors have considered Lorenz comparisons of vectors of n elements in
their works. For example, this type of analysis can be found in Kasajima et al.
[9] and Thomson [17].
4 The Least Square criterion
4.1 Least Square Solutions
The second egalitarian criterion that we consider is the Least Square criterion.
The Least Square order is complete and by applying this criterion in a convex
set we obtain uniqueness. The criterion selects Lorenz maximal allocations.
We define the Least Square Solution as follows:
LS(PI(N, d,E)) =
{
x ∈ PI(N, d,E);xAL ≻LS y
AL, for all y ∈ PI(N, d,E)
}
and the Weighted Least Square Solutions associated with the weights
λ.
λ-LS(PI(N, d,E)) =
{
x ∈ PI(N, d,E);λ-xAL ≻LS λ-y
AL,
for all y ∈ PI(N, d,E)
}
.
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The following theorem gives a simple formula with which the LS can be
easily computed.
Theorem 3 Let (N, d,E) be a problem and consider the allocation z defined as
follows:
z1 =
E −
∑
1≤i≤n
di−d1
2
n
and zi = z1 +
di − d1
2
for all i 6= 1.
Then LS(PI(N, d,E)) = z.
Proof. Let z = LS(PI(N, d,E)). Then for all i, j ∈ N we have that zj−zi =
(dj − zj)− (di − zi). Assume on the contrary that zj − zi < (dj − zj)− (di− zi).
Consider the allocation y where
yl =


zl − ε if l = i
zl + ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where ε is such that yj − yi = (dj − yj)− (di − yi). It is clear that y ≻LS z.
Now assume that zj − zi > (dj − zj) − (di − zi). Consider the allocation y
where
yl =


zl + ε if l = i
zl − ε if l = j
xl otherwise
where ε is such that yj − yi = (dj − yj)− (di − yi). It is clear that y ≻LS z.
Therefore, zj − zi = (dj − zj) − (di − zi) for all i, j ∈ N and consequently
for all j ∈ N it results zj = z1+
1
2 (dj − d1). The final step is to apply efficiency,
that is,
∑
1≤i≤n zi = E.
Similarly, it can be proved that the Weighted Least Square Solution can be
computed by the following formula:
Theorem 4 Let (N, d,E) be a claim problem, λ ∈ [0, 1] and consider the allo-
cation z defined as follows:
z1 =
E − λ
∑
1≤i≤n(di − d1)
n
and zi = z1 + λ(di − d1) for all i 6= 1.
Then λ-LS(PI(N, d,E)) = z.
Proof. Let z = λ-LS(PI(N, d,E)). Similarly to the previous theorem it
can be proved that for all i, j ∈ N we have that (1−λ)(zj − zi) = λ((dj − zj)−
(di − zi)). Consequently for all j ∈ N it results zj = z1 + λ(dj − d1). The final
step is to apply efficiency, that is,
∑
1≤i≤n zi = E.
Note that if λ = 0, λ-LS(PI(N, d,E)) = (E
n
, ..., E
n
) = EA(N, d,E) and if
λ = 1, λ-LS(PI(N, d,E)) = (di −
P
1≤i≤n di−E
n
)i∈N = EL(N, d,E).
If λ /∈ [0, 1] the allocation selected by the solution is not order preserving.
Figure 1 shows how these solutions perform in two-claimant problems when
E moves from 0 to d1 + d2.
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EA
d2
2
d1
2
Figure 1: Illustration of the Weighted Least Square Solution for different
λ when E moves from 0 to d1 + d2. The lines of slope 1 are paths of awards.
Also we draw two lines of slope −1 passing through the origin and the claims
vector which correspond with the lowest budget set and the highest budget set
respectively.
4.2 Characterizations
Not surprisingly Least Square Solutions are additive solutions and additive so-
lutions satisfying other reasonable properties must be Least Square Solutions.
The similarities with the Shapley value (Shapley [15]) and other Least Square
Solutions (the λ-prenucleolus7 among them) for TU games are clear. In TU
games, the Shapley value is a Least Square Solution (see Keane, [10]) that has
several characterizations. One of them has the additivity axiom as one of its
main axioms.
In Littlechild [11], a restricted version of additivity is used to characterize
the Shapley value of airport problems. In this version the order in the set of
claimants when considering the new airport problem must be the same as the
sum of two airport problems. In our analysis we impose only the necessary
requirement that the set of claimants must coincide in the two problems.
The proof of this characterization uses the results of the following two lem-
mas.
We say that (N, d,E) ∈ Γn if |N | = n.
Lemma 5 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, ETP and ADD. Let A =
(N, d1, E1) ∈ Γn and B = (N, d2, E2) ∈ Γn be two claim problems such that for
claimants i, j we have that d1j − d
1
i = d
2
j − d
2
i . Then φj(A)− φi(A) = φj(B)−
φi(B).
7See Ruiz et al. [13].
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Proof. Assume that the lemma is not true. Therefore, there exist two claim
problems, A = (N, d1, E1) and B = (N, d2, E2), such that for claimants i, j we
have that d1j − d
1
i = d
2
j − d
2
i and φj(A)− φi(A) 6= φj(B)− φi(B).
Let φj(A)− φi(A) = λ1 and φj(B)− φi(B) = λ2 where by assumption we
know that λ1 6= λ2. Consider the problem C = (N, d
∗, E1) where d∗ is defined
as follows:
d∗l =


d1i if l = j
d1j if l = i
d1l otherwise.
By AN we know that φi(C) = φj(A) and φj(C) = φi(A). By ADD we know
that φi(B + C) = φi(B) + φi(C).
And φj(B +C) = φj(B) + φj(C) = φj(B) + φi(A) = φj(B) + φj(A)− λ1 =
φj(B) + φi(C) − λ1 = φi(B) + λ2 + φi(C)− λ1.
Note that in the problem (B + C) claimants i and j are symmetric and
therefore by ETP φi(B + C) = φj(B + C).
Consequently λ1 = λ2, contradicting our initial assumption.
Lemma 6 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, ETP, SCIN and ADD. Then,
there exists λn ∈ R such that for any problem (N, d,E) ∈ Γ
n we have that
φj(N, d,E)− φi(N, d,E) = λ(dj − di) for all i, j ∈ N.
Proof. Assume that the lemma is not true. We consider two cases:
a) There exists a claim problem, A = (N, d,E), such that for claimants
i, j,m, p ∈ N8 we have that φj(A)− φi(A) = λ1(dj − di) and φm(A)− φp(A) =
λ2(dm−dp). By the Lemma 5 it should be the case that dj −di 6= dm−dp. Now
let k be a constant such that dj − di = k(dm − dp). By SCIN we know that
φm(kA)− φp(kA) = kφm(A)− kφp(A) = kλ2(dm − dp).
Therefore
φm(kA) − φp(kA) = kλ2(dm − dp) = λ2(dj − di).
By Lemma 5 it must hold that
φm(kA)− φp(kA) = λ1(dj − di)
and therefore,
λ2(dj − di) = λ1(dj − di)
contradicting the initial assumption.
b) There exist claim problems A and B with the same set of claimants N
such that there exist claimants i, j ∈ N for which φj(A)− φi(A) = λ1(dj − di)
and φi(B)− φj(B) = λ2(di − dj). In this case the proof of the contradiction is
similar to case a).
The main theorem of this section results from this:
8If |N | = 2 there is no contradiction and if |N | = 3 the proof below is valid assuming
j = m.
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Theorem 7 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, SCIN, ORDPRE and ADD.
Then, there exists λn ∈ [0, 1] such that for any problem (N, d,E) ∈ Γ
n we have
that φ(N, d,E) = λn-LS(N, d,E).
Proof. Lemma 6 implies that φ is a Weighted Least Square Solution in
Γn. By ORDPRE it must be true that λn ∈ [0, 1] . Therefore it only remains
to prove that Weighted Least Square Solutions with λn ∈ [0, 1] satisfy the
properties. This is immediate, so we omit the details.
Note that because additivity requires that the claim problems have the same
set of claimants the theorem applies in particular domains with fixed set of
claimants. That is, a solution φ satisfying the axioms and defined in the class
of all claim problems can be the following. Let φ be the Least Square if the
cardinality of the set of claimants is two and let φ be the Equal Awards other-
wise. Note that this type of solutions does not satisfy consistency. A solution
φ satisfies consistency if for any problem (N, d,E) and any S ⊂ N it holds that
φi(S, (di)i∈S ,
∑
i∈S φi(N, d,E) = φi(N, d,E) for all i ∈ S.
The family of Least Square Solutions contains different solutions. Each
solution is characterized adding a new property to the set of properties.
P7) We say that φ satisfies half claim boundedness (HCM) if for any
(N, d,E) ∈ Γ we have that either φi(N, d,E) ≥
dl
2 for all i ∈ N or φi(N, d,E) ≤
dl
2 for all i ∈ N .
The idea that no one must receive more than half of his\her claim when
someone else receives less than his\hers half is extensively discussed in Aumann
and Maschler [2] and is presented as one of the foundations of the Talmud Rule.
Theorem 8 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, SCIN, ETP, ADD and HCB.
Then, φ is the Least Square Solution.
Proof. By the previous theorem we know that any solution φ satisfying
AN,ETP, SCIN and ADD is a Weighted Least Square Solution (with λ ∈ R
since ORDPRE is not required). Let λ-LS be a weighted Least Square Solution
such that λ 6= 12 . Consider the following claim problem:
A = ({1, 2, ..., n− 1, n} , (2, 2, ..., 2, 4), (n− 1) + 2).
It is immediate that λ-LS(A) 6= (1, 1, ..., 1, 2). For any solution φ satisfying
HCB φ(A) = (1, 1, ..., 1, 2). Therefore it only remains to prove that the Least
Square Solution satisfies HCB. Let (N, d,E) be a problem and let LS(N, d,E) =
z. Note that for any i, j ∈ N we have that zj = zi +
1
2 (dj − di).
Assume that zi <
di
2 . Then zj = zi +
1
2 (dj − di) <
di
2 +
1
2 (dj − di) =
dj
2 .
Assume that zi >
di
2 . Then zj = zi +
1
2 (dj − di) >
di
2 +
1
2 (dj − di) =
dj
2 .
Therefore there is no pair of claimants i, j such that
zi <
di
2 and zj >
dj
2 .
Note that unlike the case of Theorem 7 this theorem applies in the domain
of all claim problems.
The HCB property inspires the following property.
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P8) We say that φ satisfies λ-claim boundedness (λ-CB) if for any
(N, d,E) ∈ Γ we have that φl(N, d,E) ≥ λdi for all i ∈ N or φl(N, d,E) ≤ λdi
for all i ∈ N .
The next theorem follows immediately.
Theorem 9 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, ETP, SCIN, ADD and λ-CB.
Then, φ is the λ-Least Square Solution.
In this way, each member of the family is individually characterized.
Finally, we relate the Proportional Solution to the Least Square family. Since
the Proportional Solution satisfies λ-CB for any λ the corollary below follows:
Corollary 10 Let A = (N, d,E) be a problem where E = λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl and let
φ be a solution that satisfies λ-CB. Then, φ(A) = λ-LS(A) = PS(A).
5 Imputations and Weighted Least Square So-
lutions
5.1 A family of solutions
Most papers on claim problems assume that a solution must select an impu-
tation. Least Square Solutions, in general, do not select imputations. This
issue can be easily solved if we restrict the domain where egalitarian criteria are
applied. Therefore if the choice of the Least Square maximal allocation is re-
stricted to the Imputation Set the resulting allocation must be an imputation.
From a computational point of view it is not difficult to find a new formula
for the new LS Solutions. However it is not so easy to characterize the new
solutions. It is clear that a solution that always selects imputations and also
satisfies the minimal desirable properties (ETP, AN and SCIN) cannot satisfy
additivity.
The following example9 shows that additive solutions satisfying ETP do not,
in general, select imputations. Alternatively, the result follows from the fact
that Weighted Least Square Solutions do not necessarily select imputations.
Bergantin˜os et al. [3] proves this result for two claimant problems. Therefore
if we require a solution to be an imputation selector we cannot ask for additive
solutions.
Example 11 Consider the following three claim problems: A = (0, 2, 2 : 2),
B = (2, 0, 2 : 2), C = (0, 0, 2 : 2) and D = (2, 2, 2 : 2).
Let φ be a solution that selects imputations satisfying additivity and ETP.
It is immediate that φ(A) = (0, 1, 1), φ(B) = (1, 0, 1), φ(C) = (0, 0, 2) and
φ(D) = (23 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 ).
9The example can be seen as an airport problem and it also illustrates that in airport
problems no solution satisfies additivity and ETP.
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By additivity φ(A + B) = φ(A) + φ(B) = (1, 1, 2) and φ(C +D) = φ(C) +
φ(D) = (23 ,
2
3 ,
8
3 ).
But φ(C+D) should be identical to φ(A+B) since they are the same claim
problem.
We focus on solutions that select imputations. Weighted Least Square Solu-
tions arise when the Least Square criterion is applied in the set ALλ(I (N, d,E)).
Consequently,
λ-LS(I(N, d,E)) =
{
x ∈ I(N, d,E);λ-xAL ≻LS λ-y
AL, for all y ∈ I(N, d,E)
}
.
We use the term Imputation Selector Weighted Least Square Solution (λ-
ISLS) for these solutions. The following theorem can be proved following the
arguments of the proof of Theorem 4 and provides the formula for the new
solutions.
Theorem 12 Let (N, d,E) be a problem and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then:
a) If
E−λ
P
n≥i≥1(di−d1)
n
∈ [0, d1] then λ-ISLS(N, d,E) = λ-LS(N, d,E).
b) If E − λ
∑
n≥i≥1(di − d1) < 0 then λ-ISLS(N, d,E) = z where
zi=
8>><
>>:
0 if i < k
E−λ
P
n≥i≥k(di−dk)
n−k+1 if i = k
λ(di − dk) if i > k
and k is the first index such that E − λ
∑
n≥i≥k(di − dk) ≥ 0.
c) If E − λ
∑
n≥l≥1 di − d1) > nd1 then λ-ISLS(N, d,E) = z where
zi=
8>><
>>:
di if i < k
E−
P
k−1≥l≥1 di−λ
P
n≥i≥k(di−dk)
n−k+1 if i = k
λ(di − dk) if i > k
and k is the first index such that E −
∑
k−1≥l≥1 di − λ
∑
n≥i≥k(di − dk) ≤
(n− k + 1)dk.
Figure 2 illustrates how these solutions perform in two-claimant problems
when E moves from 0 to d1+d2. Figure 2(a) shows the CEA and CEL solutions,
and the shaded area between them corresponds to the ISLS solutions for different
λ. Similarly, figure 2(b) shows the solutions ISLS when λ = 12 .
In this setting CEA and CEL can be seen as members of a family of solutions.
A similar result is observed by Thomson [17]. In his paper, Thomson proves
that CEA and CEL are members of the CIC family. He also mentions that
the Reverse Talmud Rule is a member of the same family. In Thomson [18] a
subfamily of the CIC family is introduced. This subfamily coincides with the
family of Weighted ISLS and similar pictures to Figure 2 can also be seen in
this paper.
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d1 x1
x2
d2
(d2 − d1)
d1
d2
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d1
2
d1 x1
x2
d2
λ(d2 − d1)
2d1 + λ(d2 − d1)
d2
2
d1
2
CEL
IS-LS
CEA
2(a) CEA and CEL 2(b) IS-LS with λ = 12
Figure 2: Illustration of the Imputation Selector Weighted Least Square
Solution for different λ when E moves from 0 to d1 + d2.
The Reverse Talmud Rule is defined as follows. Let (N, d,E) be a claim
problem. Then
T ri (N, d,E) =
{
max
{
di
2 − α, 0
}
if E ≤
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2
di
2 +min
{
di
2 , α
}
otherwise
where α is chosen such that
∑
n≥i≥1 T
r
i (N, d,E) = E.
This solution is also a member of the family of IS Weighted LS Solutions.
In fact, the Imputation Selector Least Square Solution and the Reverse Talmud
Rule are the same solution.
Theorem 13 Let (N, d,E) be a claim problem. Then T r(N, d,E) = ISLS(N, d,E).
Proof. Let z = T r(N, d,E). We distinguish 4 cases:
a) E ≤
P
n≥i≥1 di
2 and zi ∈ (0, di) for all i ∈ N.
In this case (zi − zj) =
di
2 − α − (
dj
2 − α) =
1
2 (di − dj) for all i, j ∈ N .
Therefore z = ISLS(N, d,E).
b) E ≤
P
n≥i≥1 di
2 and zl = 0 for all l ∈ {1, ..., k} .
In this case (zi−zj) =
di
2 −α−(
dj
2 −α) =
1
2 (di−dj) for all i, j ∈ {k + 1, ..., n}.
We need to prove that
E −
1
2
∑
n≥i≥k
(di − dk) ≤ 0
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or equivalently,
E −
1
2
∑
k≤i≤n
di + (n− k + 1)
1
2
dk ≤ 0.
And this is so because we know that
1
2
∑
n≥i≥k
di − E ≥ (n− k + 1)
1
2
dk
since otherwise zk > 0.
c) E >
P
n≥i≥1 di
2 and zi ∈ (0, di) for all i ∈ N.
The proof of this case is the proof of case a).
d) E >
P
n≥i≥1 di
2 and zl = dl for all l ∈ {1, ..., k} .
In this case (zi−zj) =
di
2 −α−(
dj
2 −α) =
1
2 (di−dj) for all i, j ∈ {k + 1, ..., n}.
We need to prove that
E −
∑
k−1≥i≥1 di −
1
2
∑
n≥i≥k(di − dk)
n− k + 1
≥ dk
or equivalently,
E −
∑
k−1≥l≥1
di −
1
2
∑
n≥i≥k
di + (n− k + 1)
1
2
dk ≥ (n− k + 1)dk
E −
∑
k−1≥i≥1
di −
1
2
∑
n≥i≥k
di ≥ (n− k + 1)
1
2
dk.
And this is so because we know that
E −
∑
k−1≥i≥1
di −
1
2
∑
n≥i≥k
di ≥ (n− k + 1)
1
2
dk
since otherwise zk < dk.
A Imputation Selector λ-Least Square can be formulated as a Reverse λ-
Talmud Rule in the following terms:
Let (N, d,E) be a claim problem. Then
λ-T ri (N, d,E) =
{
max {λdi − α, 0} if E ≤ λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
λdi +min {(1 − λ)di, α} otherwise
where α is chosen such that
∑
n≥i≥1 λ-T
r
i (N, d,E) = E.
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5.2 Characterizations
In the following we axiomatize this family of solutions and each of its members.
Example 11 implies that these solutions do not satisfy additivity.We now
introduce a new property called Restricted Additivity. We shall see that this
weaker property of additivity is compatible with imputation selector and, in
fact, we use the property to characterize the new family of solutions, all of them
imputation selectors.
Let A = (N, d,E) be a problem and let φ be a solution. Let T (A, φ) =
{i ∈ N : 0 < φi(A) < di} .
P9) We say that φ satisfies Restricted Additivity (RADD) if, given A =
(N, d,E) and B = (N, d′, E′) with T (A, φ) = T (B, φ) and φl(A) = φl(B) = 0
for all l /∈ T (A, φ) (or φl(A) = dl and φl(B) = dl for all l /∈ T (A, φ))) then
φ(A+B) = φ(A) + φ(B).
For this section, we also introduce the following notation. A problem A ∈
Cn,φ,k,0 if [N ] = n, [T (A, φ)] = k and φi(A) = 0 for all i /∈ T (A, φ). Similarly,
a problem B ∈ Cn,φ,k,d if [N ] = n, [T (B, φ)] = k and φi(B) = di for all
i /∈ T (B, φ).
Given a problem A = (N, d,E) by di(A) we denote the claim of i in the
problem A.
The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 14 Let φ be a solution that satisfies ORDPRE. Let (N, d,E) be a claim
problem. If φj(N, d,E) = dj then φi(N, d,E) = di for all i such that di ≤ dj . If
φj(N, d,E) = 0 then φi(N, d,E) = 0 for all i such that di ≤ dj .
Note that if a solution satisfies ADD then it satisfies RADD. The issue is
that additive solutions are not Imputation Selectors, that is, they violate the
following property:
P10) We say that a solution satisfies Imputation Selection (IS) if, given
any claim problem, it selects an imputation.
The following lemma presents IS Weighted LS Solutions as candidates for
satisfying the new properties (P9 and P10).
Lemma 15 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, SCIN, ORDPRE and RADD.
Then:
a) There exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that for any A = (N, d,E) ∈ Cn,φ,k,0 we have
that φj(A)− φi(A) = λ(dj − di) for all claimants i, j ∈ T (A, φ).
b) There exists µ ∈ [0, 1] such that for any A = (N, d,E) ∈ Cn,φ,k,d we have
that φj(A)− φi(A) = µ(dj − di) for all claimants i, j ∈ T (A, φ).
Proof. Similar to Lemma 6.
The lemma suggests that a solution satisfying these properties seems to share
some similarities with the family of solutions introduced. In order to prove that
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only these solutions satisfy the properties we need to show the following two
facts;
1.- The solution φ must be a Imputation Selector Weighted Least Square
Solution for a problem A where [T (A, φ)] = k. In other words:
Let φ be a solution satisfying the properties, let A = (N, d,E) be a problem
and let k be the last claimant for whom φk(A) = 0. Then
E − λ
∑
k≤i≤n
(di − dk) ≤ 0 and E − λ
∑
k+1≤i≤n
(di − dk+1) > 0
where λ is such that φl(A)− φi(A) = λ(dl − di) for claimants i, l ∈ T (A, φ).
Let φ be a solution satisfying the properties. Let A = (N, d,E) be a problem
and let k − 1 be the last claimant for whom φk−1(A) = dk−1. Then
E −
∑
1≤i<k−1 di − λ
∑
k≤i≤n(di − dk−1)
n− k + 2
≥ dk−1 and
E −
∑
1≤i<k di − λ
∑
k≤i≤n(di − dk)
n− k + 1
< dk
where λ is such that φl(A)− φi(A) = λ(dl − di) for claimants i, l ∈ T (A, φ).
2.- The solution φ is the same λ-ISLS for any type of claim problems. That
is, let A and B be two claim problems such that [T (A, φ)] 6= [T (B, φ)] . Then
φ(A) = λ1-ISLS and φ(B) = λ2-ISLSand λ1 = λ2.
The following two lemmas investigate the first fact. In the proofs the prop-
erty of resource monotonicity is also used. Therefore in the new characteriza-
tions ADD is replaced by RADD, IS and MON.
Lemma 16 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, SCIN, ORDPRE, IS, MON
and RADD. Then there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that for any problem A = (N, d,E) ∈
Cn,φ,k,0 we have that φ(A) = λ-ISLS(A).
Proof. By Lemma 15 we only need to prove that for any problem A =
(N, d,E) ∈ Cn,φ,k,0 with φj(A) = 0 and φj+1(A) > 0 we have that
E − λ
∑
j≤i≤n
(di − dj) ≤ 0.
where λ is such that φl(A) − φi(A) = λ(dl − di) for claimants i, l ∈ T (A, φ).
The case k = 1 (that is |T (A, φ)| = 1) is immediate and we omit the details.
We only consider when k > 1.
Assume on the contrary that
E − λ
∑
j≤i≤n(di − dj)
n− j + 1
= k > 0.
Note that it must be true that
φj+1(A)− φj(A) > λ(dj+1 − dj). (1)
19
Let C = (N, d,E∗) be a problem such that the set of claimants and their
claims are identical to problem A and E∗ is the maximal amount for which
φj(C) = 0. Clearly, E
∗ ≥ E.
Therefore, φj(N, d,E
∗+ ε) > 0 for any positive ε. Let D = (N, d,E∗+ ε) be
a problem where ε is as small as needed. Then j, j + 1, j + 2 ∈ T (D,φ) and by
Lemma 15 there exists µ ∈ [0, 1] such that
φj+2(D)− φj+1(D) = µ(dj+2 − dj+1). (2)
We consider two cases;
a) Assume that dj+2 > dj+1.
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Note that also by Lemma 15 we have that
φj+2(C)− φj+1(C) = λ(dj+2 − dj+1). (3)
By monotonicity of φ it must be true that
φj+2(D)− φj+2(C) ≤ ε and φj+1(D)− φj+1(C) ≤ ε. (4)
By (4) we know that
φj+1(D)− φj+1(C) − (φj+2(D)− φj+2(C)) ≤ ε (5)
and
φj+2(D)− φj+2(C)− (φj+1(D)− φj+1(C)) ≤ ε. (6)
Now assume that λ > µ.
Subtracting (3) from (2) we conclude that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)− (φj+1(C)− φj+1(D)) = (λ− µ)(dj+2 − dj+1) > 0.
Since ε is as small as needed this inequality contradicts (5).
Now assume that λ < µ.
Subtracting (2) from (3) we conclude that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)− (φj+1(C)− φj+1(D)) = (µ− λ)(dj+2 − dj+1) > 0.
Since ε is as small as needed this inequality contradicts (6).
Therefore we conclude that µ = λ.
Remember that as a consequence of assuming that the lemma is not true we
have that φj+1(A)− φj(A) > λ(dj+1 − dj) = µ(dj+1 − dj).
But it is immediate that if φj+1(D)− φj(D) = µ(dj+1 − dj) then φj+1(A)−
φj(A) ≤ µ(dj+1 − dj) contradicting (1).
Therefore φ(N, d,E) = λ-ISLS(N, d,E).
b) dj+1 = dj+2 = ... = dn. Let F ∈ C
n,φ,k,0 be a problem where
E − λ
∑
j≤i≤n
(di − dj) = 0 and dj+1 < dj+2.
10The proof is identical if being dj+1 = dj+2 there exists claimant l such that dl > dj+1.
In this case the role played by claimant j + 2 is played by claimant l.
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By RADD of φ we have that (A+F ) ∈ Cn,φ,k,0 and therefore φ(A+F ) = λ-
ISLS(A + F ). It is clear that dj+1(A + F ) < dj+2(A + F ) and that implies
that
E(A)− λ
∑
j≤i≤n
(di(A)− dj(A)) ≤ 0.
Lemma 17 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, SCIN, ORDPRE, MON and
RADD. Then there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that for any problem A = (N, d,E) ∈
Cn,φ,k,d we have that φ(A) = λ-ISLS(A).
Proof. By Lemma 15 we only need to prove that for any problem A =
(N, d,E) ∈ Cn,φ,k,d with φj(A) = dj and φj+1(A) < dj+1 we have that
E −
∑
1≤l≤j−1 dl − λ
∑
j≤i≤n(di − dj)
n− j + 1
≥ dj .
where λ is such that φl(A)− φi(A) = λ(dl−di) for claimants i, l ∈ T (A, φ). The
case k = 1 (that is |T (A, φ)| = 1) is immediate and we omit the details. We
only consider when k > 1.
Assume on the contrary that
E −
∑
1≤l≤j−1 dl − λ
∑
j≤i≤n(di − dj)
n− j + 1
< dj .
Note that it must be true that
φj+1(A)− φj(A) < λ(dj+1 − dj). (7)
Let C = (N, d,E∗) be a problem such that the set of claimants and their
claims are identical to problem A and E∗ is the minimal amount for which
φj(C) = dj (since φ is ORDPRE it also holds that φl(C) = dl for any l < j).
Clearly, E∗ ≤ E.
Therefore, φj(N, d,E
∗ − ε) < dj for any positive ε. Let D = (N, d,E
∗ − ε)
be a problem where ε is as small as needed. Then j, j + 1, j + 2 ∈ T (D,φ) and
by Lemma 15 there exists µ ∈ [0, 1] such that
φj+2(D)− φj+1(D) = µ(dj+2 − dj+1). (8)
We consider two cases;
a) Assume that dj+2 > dj+1.
Note that also by Lemma 15 we have that
φj+2(C)− φj+1(C) = λ(dj+2 − dj+1). (9)
By monotonicity of φ it must be true that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D) ≤ ε and φj+1(C) − φj+1(D) ≤ ε. (10)
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By (10) we know that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)− (φj+1(C) − φj+1(D)) ≤ ε (11)
and
φj+1(C)− φj+1(D)− (φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)) ≤ ε. (12)
Now assume that λ > µ.
Subtracting (9) from (8) we conclude that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)− (φj+1(C)− φj+1(D)) = (λ− µ)(dj+2 − dj+1) > 0.
Since ε is as small as needed this inequality contradicts (11).
Now assume that λ < µ.
Subtracting (8) from (9) we conclude that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)− (φj+1(C)− φj+1(D)) = (µ− λ)(dj+2 − dj+1) > 0.
Since ε is as small as needed this inequality contradicts (12).
Therefore we conclude that µ = λ.
Remember that as a consequence of assuming that the lemma is not true we
have that φj+1(A)− φj(A) < λ(dj+1 − dj) = µ(dj+1 − dj).
But it is immediate that if φj+1(D)− φj(D) = µ(dj+1 − dj) then φj+1(A)−
φj(A) ≥ µ(dj+1 − dj) contradicting (7).
Therefore φ(N, d,E) = λ-ISLS(N, d,E).
b) dj+2 = dj+1. This case is similar to the proof of case b) of Lemma 16 and
is therefore omitted.
The next two lemmas investigate the second aspect of the problem.
Lemma 18 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, SCIN, ORDPRE, MON, IS
and RADD. Then there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that for any problem A ∈ Cn,φ,k,0
(with k < |N |) and any problem B ∈ Cn,φ,k+1,0 we have that φ(A) = λ-ISLS(A)
and φ(B) = λ-ISLS(B).
Proof. We consider 2 cases:
a) Let A ∈ Cn,φ,k,0 with 1 < k < |N | such that j is the last claimant for
whom φj(A) = 0 and dj > dj−1 in case that dj 6= d1 (that is, k < n− 1).
Let C = (N, d,E∗) be a problem such that the set of claimants and their
claims are identical to problem A and E∗ is the maximal amount for which
C ∈ Cn,φ,k,0. Clearly, E∗ ≥ E.
Let D = (N, d,E∗+ε) be a problem where ε is as small as needed. Therefore,
D ∈ Cn,φ,m,0 where m > k. Then j, j + 1, j + 2 ∈ T (D,φ) and by Lemma 15
there exists µ ∈ [0, 1] such that
φj+2(D)− φj+1(D) = µ(dj+2 − dj+1). (13)
Note that also by Lemma 15 we have that
φj+2(C)− φj+1(C) = λ(dj+2 − dj+1). (14)
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By monotonicity of φ it must be true that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D) ≤ ε and φj+1(C) − φj+1(D) ≤ ε. (15)
By (15) we know that
φj+1(D)− φj+1(C) − (φj+2(D)− φj+2(C)) ≤ ε (16)
and
φj+2(D)− φj+2(C)− (φj+1(D)− φj+1(C)) ≤ ε. (17)
Now assume that λ > µ.
Subtracting (14) from (13) we conclude that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)− (φj+1(C)− φj+1(D)) = (λ− µ)(dj+2 − dj+1) > 0.
Since ε is as small as needed this inequality contradicts (16).
Now assume that λ < µ.
Subtracting (13) from (14) we conclude that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)− (φj+1(C)− φj+1(D)) = (µ− λ)(dj+2 − dj+1) > 0.
Since ε is as small as needed this inequality contradicts (17).
Therefore we conclude that µ = λ.
Note that if dj > dj−1 when selecting the problem D = (N, d,E
∗ + ε) we
can guarantee that
E∗ + ε− λ
∑
j≤i≤n
(di − dj−1) ≤ 0
and in this way D ∈ Cn,φ,k+1,0. If k = n−1 we also can guarantee (by choosing
ε) that D ∈ Cn,φ,k+1,0.
Therefore D ∈ Cn,φ,k+1,0 and φ(D) = λ-ISLS(D). By Lemma 15 we know
that for any F ∈ Cn,φ,k+1,0 it also must be true that φ(F ) = λ-ISLS(F ).
b) Let A ∈ Cn,φ,1,0 with dn−1 > dn−2. Let C = (N, d,E
∗) be a problem
such that the set of claimants and their claims are identical to problem A and
E∗ is the maximal amount for which C ∈ Cn,φ,1,0. Clearly, E∗ ≥ E.
Let D = (N, d,E∗+ε) be a problem where ε is as small as needed. Therefore,
D ∈ Cn,φ,m,0 where m > 1. By the previous case we know that there exists λ ∈
[0, 1] such that φ(D) = λ-ISLS(D).We need to prove that E∗−λ(dn−dn−1) ≤
0. Note that
φn−1(D) =
E∗ + ε− λ(dn − dn−1)
2
.
If E∗−λ(dn−dn−1) > 0 we conclude that for ε small enough it must be true
that φn−1(D) − φn−1(C) = φn−1(D) > ε and that contradicts that φ satisfies
MON. If dn−1 > dn−2 we can guarantee (by choosing ε) that D ∈ C
n,φ,2,0.
Therefore D ∈ Cn,φ,2,0 and φ(D) = λ-ISLS(D). By Lemma 15 we know
that for any F ∈ Cn,φ,2,0 it also must be true that φ(F ) = λ-ISLS(F ).
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Lemma 19 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, SCIN, ORDPRE, MON, IS
and RADD. Then there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that for any problem A ∈ Cn,φ,k,d
(with k < |N |) and any problem B ∈ Cn,φ,k+1,d we have that φ(A) = λ-ISLS(A)
and φ(B) = λ-ISLS(B).
Proof. We consider 2 cases:
a) Let A ∈ Cn,φ,k,d with 1 < k < |N | such that j is the last claimant for
which φj(A) = dj and dj > dj−1 in case k < n− 1
Let C = (N, d,E∗) be a problem such that the set of claimants and their
claims are identical to problem A and E∗ is the minimal amount for which
C ∈ Cn,φ,k,d. Clearly, E∗ ≤ E.
Let D = (N, d,E∗−ε) be a problem where ε is as small as needed. Therefore,
D ∈ Cn,φ,m,0 where m < k. Then j, j + 1, j + 2 ∈ T (D,φ) and by Lemma 15
there exists µ ∈ [0, 1] such that
φj+2(D)− φj+1(D) = µ(dj+2 − dj+1). (18)
Note that also by Lemma 15 we have that
φj+2(C)− φj+1(C) = λ(dj+2 − dj+1). (19)
By monotonicity of φ it must be true that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D) ≤ ε and φj+1(C) − φj+1(D) ≤ ε. (20)
By (20) we know that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)− (φj+1(C) − φj+1(D)) ≤ ε (21)
and
φj+1(C)− φj+1(D)− (φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)) ≤ ε. (22)
Now assume that λ > µ.
Subtracting (19) from (18) we conclude that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)− (φj+1(C)− φj+1(D)) = (λ− µ)(dj+2 − dj+1) > 0.
Since ε is as small as needed this inequality contradicts (21).
Now assume that λ < µ.
Subtracting (18) from (19) we conclude that
φj+2(C)− φj+2(D)− (φj+1(C)− φj+1(D)) = (µ− λ)(dj+2 − dj+1) > 0.
Since ε is as small as needed this inequality contradicts (22).
Therefore we conclude that µ = λ.
Note that if dj > dj−1 when selecting the problem D = (N, d,E
∗ − ε) we
can guarantee that
E∗ − ε−
∑
1≤l≤j−2 dl − λ
∑
j−1≤i≤n(di − dj−1)
n− j + 2
≥ dj−1
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and in this way D ∈ Cn,φ,k+1,d. If k = n−1 we also can guarantee (by choosing
ε) that D ∈ Cn,φ,k+1,0.
Therefore D ∈ Cn,φ,k+1,d and φ(D) = λ-ISLS(D). By Lemma 15 we know
that for any F ∈ Cn,φ,k+1,d it also must be true that φ(F ) = λ-ISLS(F ).
b) Let A ∈ Cn,φ,1,d. with dn−2 < dn−1. Let C = (N, d,E
∗) be a problem
such that the set of claimants and their claims are identical to problem A and
E∗ is the minimal amount for which C ∈ Cn,φ,1,d. Clearly, E∗ ≤ E. Let D =
(N, d,E∗ − ε) be a problem where ε is as small as needed. Therefore, D ∈
Cn,φ,2,d. By the previous case we know that there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] such that
φ(D) = λ-ISLS(D). We need to prove that
E∗ −
∑
1≤l≤n−2 dl − λ(dn − dn−1)
2
≥ dn−1. (23)
Assume on the contrary that
dn−1 −
E∗ −
∑
1≤l≤n−2 dl − λ(dn − dn−1)
2
= k > 0.
Note that since D ∈ Cn,φ,2,d we have that
φn−1(D) =
E∗ − ε−
∑
1≤l≤n−2 dl − λ(dn − dn−1)
2
.
If (23) does not hold we conclude that for ε small enough it must be true
that
φn−1(C)− φn−1(D) = dn−1 − φn−1(D) =
E∗ −
∑
1≤l≤n−2 dl − λ(dn − dn−1)
2
+ k − φn−1(D) =
= k +
ε
2
.
This contradicts that φ satisfies MON since it must be true that φn−1(C)−
φn−1(D) ≤ ǫ and that implies that for any ε it must be true that k ≤
ε
2 and
that implies k ≤ 0.
Note that if dn−1 > dn−2 we can guarantee (by choosing ε) thatD ∈ C
n,φ,2,d.
Therefore D ∈ Cn,φ,2,d and φ(D) = λ-ISLS(D). By Lemma 15 we know
that for any F ∈ Cn,φ,2,d it also must be true that φ(F ) = λ-ISLS(F ).
With the above lemmas the two questions are answered positively and the
main theorem results.
Theorem 20 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, SCIN, ORDPRE, MON, IS
and RADD. Then, there exists λn ∈ [0, 1] such that for any problem (N, d,E) ∈
Γn we have that φ(N, d,E) = λn-ISLS(N, d,E).
Proof. With the above lemmas we know that if φ satisfies AN, SCIN, OR-
DPRE, MON, IS and RADD on Γnthen φ must be an λn-ISLS with λn ∈ [0, 1]
in Γn. It only remains to prove that λn-ISLS satisfies AN, SCIN, ORDPRE,
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MON, IS and RADD in Γn. The fact that λn-ISLS satisfies RADD is a con-
sequence of the fact that if given two claim problems, A and B, with the same
set of claimants we have that A,B ∈ Cn,λn-ISLS,p,0 (or A,B ∈ Cn,λn-ISLS,p,d)
then A + B ∈ Cn,λn-ISLS,p,0 (or A + B ∈ Cn,λn-ISLS,p,d). It is immediate that
λn-ISLS satisfies the rest of the properties.
Note that because restricted additivity requires problems to have the same
set of claimants the theorem applies in particular domains with fixed set of
claimants. That is, a solution φ defined in the class of all claim problems
satisfying the axioms of Theorem 20 is the following. Let φ be the Imputation
Selector Least Square if the cardinality of the set of claimants is two and let φ
be the Constrained Equal Awards otherwise.
In order to single out the Imputation Selector Least Square Solution from
the family of λ-ISLS we again use the axiom of HCB.
Theorem 21 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, SCIN, ETP, MON, IS,
RADD and HCB. Then, φ is the Imputation Selector Least Square Solution.
Proof. By Theorem 8 it only remains to prove that the Imputation Selector
Least Square Solution satisfies HCB. This is immediate since T r(N, d,E) =
ISLS(N, d,E).
Note that unlike the case of Theorem 20 this theorem applies in the domain
of all claim problems. Thomson [18] also characterizes the reverse Talmud rule
by showing that it is the unique member of the CIC family that satisfies self-
duality (Proposition 1).
In order to single out the Imputation Selector Weighted Least Square Solu-
tions from the family of λ-ISLS we use again the axiom of λ-CB.
Theorem 22 Let φ be a solution that satisfies AN, SCIN, ETP, MON, IS,
RADD and λ-CB with λ ∈ (0, 1). Then, φ is the λ-Imputation Selector Least
Square Solution.
For λ = 0 and λ = 1 the definition of λ-CB should be modified slightly.
Otherwise CEA and CEL cannot be characterized with the axioms of the The-
orem above since by definition any solution satisfying IS must satisfy 0-CB and
1-CB.
P11) We say that φ satisfies strict 0-claim boundedness (strict 0-CB)
if for any claim problem, (N, d,E) ∈ Γ, E > 0 and d1 > 0, we have that
φl(N, d,E) > 0 for any l ∈ N .
P12) We say that φ satisfies strict 1-claim boundedness (strict 1–CB)
for any claim problem, (N, d,E) ∈ Γ, E > 0 and d1 > 0, we have that
φl(N, d,E) < dl for any l ∈ N .
CEA is the only solution that satisfies AN, SCIN, ETP, MON, IS, RADD
and strict 0-CB and CEL is characterized with AN, SCIN, ETP, MON, IS,
RADD and strict 1-CB
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6 The Lexicographic criterion
6.1 A family of solutions
Another central solution in the literature of claim problems is the Talmud Rule
introduced by Aumman and Maschler [2]. The solution is presented as the rule
that explains the resolution of three numerical examples that can be found in the
Talmud. For many years was an open problem what solution was behind these
examples. Aumann and Maschler prove that their rule prescribes the proposals
of the examples in the Talmud. They also prove that the solution coincides with
the nucleolus of a TU game associated with the claim problem.
The nucleolus (Schmeidler [14]) selects lexicographical maximal elements in
the set of vectors of satisfactions of the coalitions. It can be seen that the
Talmud Rule is also a Lexicographic solution. First we introduce the definition
of the Talmud rule.
Let (N, d,E) be a claim problem. Then
Ti(N, d,E) =
{
min
{
di
2 , α
}
if E ≤
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2
di
2 +max
{
di
2 − α, 0
}
otherwise
where α is chosen such that
∑
n≥i≥1 Ti(N, d,E) = E.
This solution provides the allocation whose vector of awards-losses is the
lexicographically maximal vector in the set |AL(I (N, d,E))| . That is,
Theorem 23 Let (N, d,E) be a claim problem. Then
T (N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ I(N, d,E);
∣∣xAL∣∣ Lex ∣∣yAL∣∣ , for all y ∈ I(N, d,E)} .
Proof. Let z = T (N, d,E). We distinguish 4 cases:
a) E ≤
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and zi <
di
2 for all i ∈ N.
Then the first n elements of the vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (E
n
, ..., E
n
) and clearly∣∣zAL∣∣ lexicographically dominates any other vector ∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is a imputa-
tion.
b) E ≤
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and zl =
di
2 for all l ∈ {1, ..., k} . Then the first 2k elements
of the vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (d12 , d12 , ...., dk2 , dk2 ) and the next (n − k) elements
are (
E− 1
2
P
k≥l≥1 dl
n−k
, ...,
E− 1
2
P
k≥l≥1 dl
n−k
). Clearly
∣∣zAL∣∣ lexicographically dominates
any other vector
∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is a imputation.
c) E >
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and di > zi >
di
2 for all i ∈ N.
Then the first n elements of the vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (Pn≥l≥1 dl−E
n
, ...,
P
n≥l≥1 dl−E
n
)
and clearly
∣∣zAL∣∣ lexicographically dominates any other vector ∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is
a imputation.
d) E >
P
n≥l≥1 dl
2 and zl =
di
2 for all l ∈ {1, ..., k} . Then the first 2k elements
of the vector θ(
∣∣zAL∣∣) are (d12 , d12 , ...., dk2 , dk2 ) and the next (n− k) elements are
(
1
2
∑
n≥l≥k+1 dl −
1
2E
n− k
, ...,
1
2
∑
n≥l≥k+1 dl −
1
2E
n− k
).
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Clearly
∣∣zAL∣∣ lexicographically dominates any other vector ∣∣yAL∣∣ where y is
a imputation.
Weighted Talmud Rules11 are introduced and studied by Moreno-Ternero
and Villar [12]. They call this family of solutions the TAL-family.
Let (N, d,E) be a problem. Then
λ-Ti(N, d,E) =
{
min {λdi, α} if E ≤ λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl
λdi +max {(1− λ)di − α, 0} otherwise
where α is chosen such that
∑
n≥i≥1 λ-Ti(N, d,E) = E.
It is not difficult to check that this solution provides the allocation whose
vector of awards-losses is maximal in the set
∣∣ALλ(I (N, d,E))∣∣ . That is for
λ ∈ (0, 1) we have that
λ-T (N, d,E) =
{
x ∈ I(N, d,E);
∣∣λ-xAL∣∣ Lex ∣∣λ-yAL∣∣ , for all y ∈ I(N, d,E)} .
Weighted Talmud Rules always select imputations and satisfy their associ-
ated λ-CB.
Since the Proportional Solution satisfies λ-CB for any λ the following corol-
lary is immediate and relates the Proportional Solution with the family of
Weighted Talmud Rules.
Corollary 24 Let A = (N, d,E) be a problem where E = λ
∑
n≥l≥1 dl and let
φ be a solution that satisfies λ-CB. Then, φ(A) = λ-T (A) = PS(A).
6.2 Characterizations
Auman and Maschler [2] characterize the Talmud rule as the unique consistent
solution for bankruptcy problems (Theorem A). In their work consistency is also
called CG-consistency and explained as follows:
Intuitively, a solution is consistent if any two claimants i,j use
the contested garment principle to divide between them the total
amount xi + xj awarded to them by the solution.
The contested garment principle is a solution used to solve two-claimant
problems. The solution coincides with the Talmud Rule and the theorem can
be interpreted as follows; the Talmud rule is the unique solution that consistently
extends to n claimant problems the contested garment principle.
Replacing the contested garment principle by the solution prescribed by
a Weighted Talmud Rule in two claimant problems we can characterize this
11Hokari and Thomson [7] use this term for Talmud rules that do not satisfy ETP. That is,
the weights refer to the claimants and not to awards-losses. We keep the term since we think
there is no confusion and it is more consistent with the rest of the paper.
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Weighted Talmud Rule as the unique solution that consistently extends to n
claimant problems this solution prescribed for two claimant problems.
Thomson [18] also characterizes the Talmud rule by showing that is the
unique member of the ICI family that satisfies self-duality (Proposition 1).
7 Conclusions
7.1 A summary
A remember of the two questions that motivated this research
1. What egalitarian criterion is used to make egalitarian comparisons be-
tween elements?
2. From what set are those elements taken?
The table below is a summary of the answers.
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Solution Criterion Domain Weight: λ
CEA LS and Lex ALλ(I (N, d,E)) 0
CEL LS and Lex ALλ(I (N, d,E)) 1
ISLS or T r LS ALλ(I (N, d,E)) 12
λ-ISLS or λ-T r LS ALλ(I (N, d,E)) λ
T Lex
∣∣ALλ(I (N, d,E))∣∣ 12
λ-T Lex
∣∣ALλ(I (N, d,E))∣∣ λ
PS LS and Lex
∣∣ALλ(I (N, d,E))∣∣ EP
n≥l≥1 dl
LS LS ALλ(PI (N, d,E)) 12
λ-LS LS ALλ(PI (N, d,E)) λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
The table gives a unified framework to place many different solutions that
have been introduced and analyzed by several authors.
Arin [1] presents a similar summary concerning solution concepts defined for
TU games.
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7.2 Extensions
The table also indicates how to extend this type of solutions to other different
settings. In particular, in airport problems (Littlechild, [11]) it is generally ac-
cepted that solutions must select core allocations and not merely imputations.
Therefore, the search for egalitarian maximal elements should be restricted to
the core of the airport problem and Core Selector Weighted Least Square So-
lutions are immediately defined. In other settings, other constraints may exist
and solutions are required to satisfy them. This is a restriction of the set where
egalitarian maximal elements are sought. Also in claim problems different con-
straints could be considered. Chun et al. [5] define an egalitarian solution with
respect to awards that satisfy the Half Claim Boundedness property. In his
case the constraint is not only to be an Imputation Selector but also to select
allocations that do not violate HCB.
An identical approach can be taken to analyze surplus sharing problems
where agents must divide a surplus jointly generated but with different partici-
pation rights. Agents can evaluate the fairness of any proposal by checking how
much they have received and how much they have gained with respect to their
rights.
In fact, Ju et al. [8] also follow a general approach to deal with different eco-
nomic problems that share similarities in their mathematical modelling. They
use the term ”entity” instead of claimant or even agent in order to ensure that
their analysis is valid for different settings.
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